Texas law reporters are brimming with cases involving failed sales or transfers of land based on vague, confusing or just plain wrong descriptions the real property intended to be conveyed. Under Texas law, inadequate property descriptions -- particularly those that don't identify the property location -- will render a deed or other conveyance document ineffectual. This is true because location is an essential element of a deed, without which the deed is void. See Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1945).
To be sufficient, a writing conveying title must provide within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing in existence at the time of the deed, the means or information by which the land being conveyed can be identified with reasonable certainty. Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.1973). This has been termed the "nucleus of description" theory.
"If enough appears in the description so that a party familiar with the locality can identify the premises with reasonable certainty, it will be sufficient." Gates v. Asher, 154 Tex. 538, 541, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248 (1955) (citations omitted). Likewise, "if there appears in the instrument enough to enable one by pursuing an inquiry based upon the information contained in the deed to identify the particular property to the exclusion of others, the description will be held sufficient." Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 658 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). However, "a deed purporting to convey land, which describes it only by quantity and as being part of a larger tract (i.e. "25 acres out of he King Ranch"), with nothing whereby to identify what specific portion of the larger tract is intended to be conveyed, is VOID for uncertainty of description." Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 358-59, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935).
San Antonio's Fourth Court of Appeals addressed the "nucleus of description" theory in a real estate case it considered in 2009. In that case, Gaut v. Daniel, 293 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 2009), the Court considered a 1990 deed conveying 28 acres in Duval County. The acreage in question was part of a larger (399.5 acre) tract, but the deed conveying the property, which purported to contain surveyor's notes, failed to identify any discernible location of the 28 acre tract. The Court's holding: "Because nothing identifies which 28 acres out of the 399.5 are being conveyed, the deed is void" Gaut, 293 S.W.3d at 770.
With the significant rush to obtain, break and transfer property interests, including deeds and leases, caused by the boom in the Eagle Ford shale and other oil and gas formations in Texas, sufficiency of property descriptions have become of preeminent importance.
In an interesting case decided by the 5th Circuit appeals court in 2012, Chesapeake Exploration unsuccessfully attempted to invalidate its agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy Corporation in certain oil and gas leases Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2012). When the price of natural gas plummeted several months later, Chesapeake refused to honor its commitment. When Peak filed suit, Chesapeake argued that the parties' agreement was unenforceable under the Texas statute of frauds and fatally indefinite based upon the flawed property descriptions. The district court disagreed, rendering judgment in favor of Peak and its principals and awarding them damages in the amount of more $19 million. This judgment was affirmed by the appeals court.
Thus, persons drafting deeds and other conveyance documents, as well as those contemplating the sufficiency of existing deed documents, must be mindful of the nucleus of description theory.
